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Critical infrastructures, usually designed to handle disruptions caused by human
errors or random acts of nature, define assets whose normal operation must be
guaranteed to maintain its essential services for human daily living. Malicious
intended attacks to these targets need to be considered during system design.
To face with these situations, defense plans must be developed in advance.
In this paper, we present a UML profile, named SecAM, that enables the
modelling and security specification for critical infrastructures during the early
phases (requirements, design) of systems development life-cycle. SecAM endows
security assessment, through survivability analysis, of different security solutions
before system deployment. As a case study, we evaluate the survivability of the
Saudi Arabia crude-oil pipeline network under two different attack scenarios.
The stochastic analysis, carried out with Generalized Stochastic Petri nets,
quantitatively estimates the minimisation of attack damages into the crude-oil
network.
Keywords: security, software system engineering, UML, survivability, sensitive analysis
1. INTRODUCTION
A critical infrastructure describes a facility, system,
site or network whose loose or compromise represents
a major impact on the availability or integrity of
essential services for daily life operations, leading to
severe financial looses, social consequences or even
to put in risk human lives. For instance, the U.S.
government defines as critical infrastructures the sectors
related to water, energy, food and even information and
telecommunications [1].
Infrastructures are usually planned to handle
disruptions caused by human errors, or by unexpected
acts of nature, having a small or not measurable
degradation in performance. However, these critical
assets represent a main target for terrorist attack plans,
aiming at damaging as much as possible governments
and citizens [1]. Suppose that a coordinated attack
disrupts the power system paths from an energy
station, thus losing power to end customers (home users
and industries). As a consequence, power-dependent
activities stop, then causing economic distress, among
other fatalities. This turns to be even worst when
an attacker disrupts safety-critical assets, such as the
SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition)
system of a water treatment plant or an oil & gas
distribution network thus provoking a poisoning of the
population.
As it is stated in [2], critical infrastructures must
not only be safe (i.e., able to face random disrupting
events), but also secure systems (i.e., able to face
malicious intended attacks). That is, a critical
infrastructure must have a security level enabling it to
identify unexpected but intended events, must handle
them and must recover from them. We thus need to
develop in advance defense plans to protect critical
infrastructures. Survivability strategies [3] - that
include resistance, recognition and recovery phases- aim
at providing protection for critical infrastructures in the
presence of attacks. Since the attacks of September
11, 2001, to the Twin Towers there has been an
even growing interest by the worldwide communities
on the physical and cyber-security issues in critical
infrastructures [1], so security and survivability should
be considered as first-class properties in the system
development life-cycle. We propose a specific language
named SecAM (stands for Security Analysis and
Modelling) that allows the security specification and
modelling of critical infrastructures. SecAM is integrated
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with UML (Unified Modelling Language [4]) as a
Profile [5], and enables survivability analysis for critical
infrastructures, which means to provide capabilities for
assessing defense plans.
The benefits of integrating security in the design of
critical infrastructures are several. For instance, it
enables to specify, both qualitatively and quantitatively,
security and survivability requirements as well as
to carry out sensitive analysis of different security
solutions considering different attack scenarios. In
this realm, our approach comes to fill some gaps in
the literature regarding the modelling and analysis of
critical infrastructures. Firstly, we propose models
for the critical infrastructure and for attack patterns,
these models can be merged to carry out survivability
analysis. In particular, the attack patterns address
the three phases of survivability previously mentioned
– resistance, recognition and recovery –. Secondly,
the survivability analysis is addressed through formal
methods, in particular, Generalized Stochastic Petri
nets [6]. Our approach obtains well-formed Petri nets
that can be verified using standard model-checking
techniques. The kind of analyses that can be performed
is very rich indeed. Although the paper illustrates
qualitative analysis and vulnerability analysis, the Petri
net also allows to compute resource optimisation of
the critical infrastructure, and to provide feedback to
the engineers designing a critical system by reporting
system bottlenecks (i.e., the slowest part in the system).
Last but not least, the kind of techniques that can be
used for Petri net analysis is also very rich. In the
paper we apply efficient techniques, linear algebra and
linear programming-based techniques [7] and steady
state analysis, also simulation of the Petri net can be
performed.
SecAM promotes an integrated view of security
considering all stages of the critical infrastructures life-
cycle. We show the potential of SecAM in Section 6
by assessing security issues of the Saudi Arabia crude-
oil pipeline network. We initially model using SecAM
this critical infrastructure and propose two different
attack scenarios. First, a physical attack to multiple
network facilities and later a coordinated cyber-attack
to the SCADA system. The attack scenarios develop
survivability strategies for the system to be timely
recovered.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2
describes technical background. Section 3 introduces
SecAM, developing its core components. Section 4
details the steps we followed to develop the Saudi
Arabia crude oil pipeline network case study. Section 5
models the critical infrastructure and the attack
scenarios of the case study. Section 6 assesses the
survivability analysis of the infrastructure. Section 7
reviews some works in the literature. Finally, Section 8
concludes the paper.
2. TECHNICAL BACKGROUND
2.1. UML and Profiles
UML is a language for systems and software specifica-
tion. It addresses structural, behavioural and deploy-
ment issues. Profiling [5] is a technique introduced in
UML to add new capabilities to the language, in our
case security modelling and analysis capabilities. A
UML Profile is just an extension of the UML defined
in terms of:
• Stereotypes or concepts in the target domain that
will be added to UML. For example, SecAM adds
stereotypes to model attacks or intrusions.
• Tags, the attributes of the stereotypes. For
example, for the attack stereotype we define
attributes such as its type, objective or location.
SecAM relies on two profiles: the standard MARTE [8]
(Modelling and Analysis of Real-Time and Embed-
ded systems) and DAM [9] (Dependability Analysis
and Modelling), see relationships among them in Fig-
ure 1(a). SecAM inherits from MARTE its analy-
sis capabilities, among other features, and from DAM
those concepts shared by the dependability and security
fields [10].
2.2. Generalized Stochastic Petri Nets
A Generalized Stochastic Petri net (GSPN) [6] is a
bipartite graph, in which the vertices can be either
transitions or places. The transitions represent events
that may occur in the system, they can be immediate
or exponentially distributed. The former, depicted by
black bars, fire in zero time and the latter, depicted by
white bars, fire according to the specified distribution.
The places, represented by circles, are used to model
conditions. The directed arcs, shown by arrows,
describe which places are pre- or post-conditions for
which transitions. Places may contain tokens, depicted
by black dots.
The GSPN dynamics is governed by the transition
enabling and firing rules. A transition is enabled
whenever there is at least a token in each of its pre-
condition places. When it fires, a token is consumed
from each of its pre-condition places and a token is
produced in each of its post-condition places.
3. MODELLING SECURITY OF CRITICAL
INFRASTRUCTURES
SecAM is organized in two main packages, the Se-
cAM UML Extensions, that includes a set of stereo-
types, and the SecAM Library, that contains basic and
complex types used to define the tags of the stereo-
types, see Figure 1(a). SecAM stereotypes are divided
in four sub-packages, Resilience, Cryptographic, Secu-
rityMechanisms and AccessControl, as depicted in Fig-
ure 1(b). This organization addresses different security
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<<profile>>
MARTE
<<profile>>
DAM
<<profile>>
SecAM
<<modelLibrary>>
SecAM_Library
SecAM_UML_Extensions
<<modelLibrary>>
SecAM::SecAM_Library
Basic_SECA_Types
Complex_SECA_Types <<profile>>
MARTE::VSL::DataType
<<modelLibrary>>
MARTE::MARTE_Library::BasicNFP_Types
<<import>>
<<apply>>
<<import>>
<<import>>
<<import>>
<<import>>
<<import>>
(a) (b)
FIGURE 1. (a) SecAM profile and SecAM Library, (b) SecAM UML extensions (subpackages).
Security SecAM packages
attributes (P1) (P2) (P3) (P4)
Integrity
√ √ √
Availability
√ √
Confidentiality
√ √ √
Authorisation
√
Non-repudiation
√
Authenticity
√
(P1): Cryptographic; (P2): SecurityMechanisms
(P3): Resilience; (P4): AccessControl
TABLE 1. Security attributes covered by SecAM.
issues of relevance for critical infrastructures. These
issues are typically dealt by independent research com-
munities, SecAM encompasses all of them to produce a
common security specification.
We have used a breadth-first approach to provide
these common basis for the specification of security.
Each sub-package deals with a subset of well-
known security attributes [11] (integrity, availability,
confidentiality, authorisation, non-repudiation and
authenticity) and, as shown in Table 1, the sub-packages
overlap with respect to attribute coverage.
3.1. SecAM::Resilience package
The Resilience package addresses the (malicious) threat
characterization. It enables the specification in UML
behavioural diagrams of attacks, vulnerabilities and
intrusion concepts, and also their causal relation-
ships (i.e., the attack-vulnerability-intrusion or AVI
chain) [12]. The package was initially proposed in [13]
to conduct a vulnerability stochastic analysis.
Figure 2 details the package. It mainly contains
two stereotypes, SecaAttackGenerator and SecaStep,
that specialise some DAM stereotypes. Hence, by
inheritance, they can be applied to all those UML
behavioural model elements that can be stereotyped
with the DAM ones. For example, SecaStep can
stereotype action or activity states in activity diagrams.
SecaStep has three tags, kind, vulnerability and
intrusion and also inherits hostDemand, which
describes its computational requirements, and prob,
which indicates the probability of the step to be
executed (for a conditional execution). Each tag
has a type which is completely described in the
SecAM Library, Figure 2 right hand side. For example,
the type of intrusion is SecaIntrusion and it owns
three tags, one of them successProb to define the
probability for the attack to success.
The SecaAttackGenerator has the tag attack of
type SecaAttack to completely describe an attack as
follows. The type of attack can be active or passive.
The different classes of attacks (ClassOfAttack) are
compliant to the taxonomy defined by Hansman and
Hunt in [14], e.g., virus trojan, or worm. The
KindOfAttack [15] depends on the method adopted by
the attacker to succeed in the intent, e.g., injection
or resource modification. For the objective of the
attack (AttackObjective) we can distinguish: denial
of service, run arbitrary code, privilege escalation, data
modification and information leakage. Considering
from where the attack is actuating, three different
locations [16] can be identified (AttackLocation):
single-source (originated at only one host), multi-source
(replicated over multiple hosts), and reflector-source
(the attacker uses legitimate hosts to attack the victim,
hiding so his identity or amplifying his attack [17]).
Finally, the target of an attack represents execution
resources such as classes, instances, components, parts,
and deployment nodes stereotyped as gaExecHost.
Finally, the concept of coordinated attack is
introduced by the complex type SecaCoordAttack.
A coordinated attack allows attackers to avoid an
intrusion detection by splitting a malicious attack
pattern in several sub-patterns (attacks attribute).
It can be classified (coordType attribute) as [18]:
a cumulative attack, when simultaneous attacks are
initiated to overcome computer limitations; a replicated
attack, when several attacks target replicated services
occur to bring down the entire service structure; or a
mixed attack, i.e., a combination of the previous ones.
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<<stereotype>>
SecaAttackGenerator
attack : SecaAttack
<<stereotype>>
DAM::DaFaultGenerator
<<profile>>
SecAM::Resilience
<<tupleType>>
DAM::DaFault
ocurrenceProb : NFP_Real[*]
<<tupleType>>
SecaCoordAttack
coordType : CoordinationType
attacks : SecaAttack[2..*]
/ ocurrenceProb : NFP_Real[*]
<<tupleType>>
SecaIntrusion
successProb : NFP_Real
origin : SecaVulnerable
cause : SecaAttack
<<tupleType>>
SecaVulnerable
degree : Degree
composed : SecaVulnerable[*]
<<tupleType>>
SecaAttack
type : TypeOfAttack
class : ClassOfAttack
location : AttackLocation
objective : AttackObjective
kind: KindOfAttack[*]
target: GaExecHost
<<stereotype>>
DAM::DaStep
<<stereotype>>
SecaStep
vulnerability : SecaVulnerable
intrusion : SecaIntrusion
kind :SecaStepKind
<<Constant>> Injection
<<Constant>> ResourceModification
<<Constant>> ProtocolManipulation
<<Constant>> Analysis
<<Constant>> APIabuse
<<Constant>> BruteForce
<<Constant>> Flooding
<<Constant>> Spoofing
<<Constant>> SocialEngineering
<<Constant>> Explosive
<<enumeration>>
KindOfAttack
<<Constant>> Denial-Of-Service
<<Constant>> RunArbitraryCode
<<Constant>> PrivilegeScalation
<<Constant>> DataModification
<<Constant>> InformationLeakage
<<enumeration>>
AttackObjective
<<Constant>> Single-source
<<Constant>> Multi-source
<<Constant>> Reflector-source
<<enumeration>>
AttackLocation
<<Constant>> Virus
<<Constant>> Worm
<<Constant>> BufferOverflow
<<Constant>> ResourceConsuming
<<Constant>> Physical
<<Constant>> Password
<<Constant>> InformationGathering
<<Constant>> Trojan
<<enumeration>>
ClassOfAttack
<<Constant>> Cumulative
<<Constant>> Replicated
<<Constant>> Mixed
<<enumeration>>
CoordinationType
<<Constant>> Active
<<Constant>> Passive
<<enumeration>>
TypeOfAttack
<<modelLibrary>>
SecAM::SecAM_Library
<<import>>
FIGURE 2. The SecAM::Resilience package.
<<modelLibrary>>
SecAM::SecAM_Library
<<import>>
<<Constant>>  Software
<<Constant>>  Hardware
<<Constant>>  Biometric
<<enumeration>>
KeyType
<<Constant>>  Assymmetric
<<Constant>>  Symmetric
<<enumeration>>
KeyKind
<<Constant>>  Zero
<<Constant>>  Bit
<<Constant>>  Byte
<<enumeration>>
PaddingScheme
<<Constant>>  ECB
<<Constant>>  CBC
<<Constant>>  CFM
<<Constant>>  OFM
<<Constant>>  CTR
<<enumeration>>
OperationMode
<<Constant>>  Synchronous
<<Constant>>  Asynchronous
<<enumeration>>
StreamType
<<Constant>>  Periodic
<<Constant>>  NonPeriodic
<<enumeration>>
Perioricity
<<Constant>>  vulnerable
<<Constant>>  intrusion
<<Constant>>  cryptographic
<<Constant>>  messageDigest
<<enumeration>>
SecaStepKind
 size : NFP_Integer
 type : KeyType
 kind : KeyKind[0..1]
 cipher : SecaCipher[0..1]
<<tupleType>>
SecaKey
 type : StreamType
 perioricity : Perioricity
key : SecaKey
<<tupleType>>
SecaStream
 size : NFP_Integer
 padding : PaddingScheme[0..1]
 opMode : OperationMode
 concreteAlgorithm : NFP_String
<<tupleType>>
SecaBlock
 errorRate : NFP_Real
 operationalRate : NFP_Real
 kind : CipherKind
<<tupleType>>
SecaCipher
<<Constant>>  Stream
<<Constant>>  Block
<<enumeration>>
CipherKind
 kind : SecaStepKind
 cryptographic : SecaKey
 hash : SecaMessageDigest
<<stereotype>>
SecaStep
<<stereotype>>
DAM::DaStep
 length : NFP_DataSize
 padding : PaddingScheme[0..1]
 opMode : OperationMode
 blocks : SecaBlock [1..*]
<<tupleType>>
SecaMessageDigest
 key : SecaKey
<<tupleType>>
SecaMAC
SecAM::Cryptography
<<profile>>
FIGURE 3. The SecAM::Cryptographic package.
3.2. SecAM::Cryptographic package
Cryptography [19] is primarily used to gain confidential-
ity over the communications between pairs, however, it
also supports data integrity and authentication. The
Cryptographic package deals with security properties
related to ciphers and algorithms. Hence, the package
mainly supports the specification of cryptographic de-
sign of the critical infrastructure and its performance
characteristics, see Figure 3.
The SecaStep stereotype, already considered in
the Resilience package, is now used to specify a
cryptographic step through the new tags: kind,
cryptographic and hash. The cryptographic tag is
a complex type (SecaKey) that enables to characterize
the key, either asymmetric or symmetric (KeyKind).
The latter can be of different types, depending
on how/where it is deployed (KeyType): software,
hardware (i.e., cryptographic devices) or biometric
(e.g., fingerprint, facial recognition or retinal scanning).
A cipher (SecaCipher) can be either a block or stream
cipher, depending on the algorithm, and it uses a key.
It is characterized by an error rate, i.e., the ratio of
errors that the cipher can suffer during the process of
encryption/decryption, and an operational rate, i.e., the
number of encrypted/decrypted bits per time unit.
A stream cipher (SecaStream) uses a key-stream to
cipher/decipher plain text, which generates a stream
of secret bits given an initial key. It can be either
self-synchronous (i.e., ciphertext-auto-key, CTAK) or
synchronous (i.e., key-auto-key, KAK), depending on
whether the used key-stream is influenced or not
by the ciphered/deciphered text. A block cipher
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(SecaBlock) has a block size, that is the number of
characters (or bits) of the plain text message which
can be ciphered at a time. Normally, the partition
of the message into blocks is not exact and, therefore,
a padding scheme is needed. Besides, it uses an
operation mode (OperationMode) which determines its
encryption/decryption scheme, we rely on the ones
approved by NIST [20].
A message digest (SecaMessageDigest), also called
hash, is a value calculated through a cryptographic
hash function. Such a value is used, for instance, to
determine if a message has been altered. When the
cryptographic hash function uses a key (then called
keyed hash function), the obtained value is called
message authentication code (MAC, SecaMAC). MAC
values assure data integrity and data authenticity.
3.3. SecAM::SecurityMechanisms package
The SecurityMechanisms package, depicted in Figure 4,
characterises both hardware and software solutions
provided by the critical infrastructure to attain
security. It comprises basic cryptographic devices [19],
more sophisticated ones [21–23], the use of security
communication links such as Virtual Private Networks,
honeypots [24] or any kind of security software.
A security mechanism can be located either in a
host machine or in a network. In the first case, it
can be either a software, e.g., the Windows firewall or
UNIX packet-filtering rules (SecaHostFirewall). In
the second case, it can be a hardware device, e.g., a
wormhole [23] or a cryptographic token/accelerator [19].
The type of defense (DefenceType) of the security
mechanism can be proactive, reactive or both [23].
Several types of specialised security hardware
mechanisms can be distinguished: crypto hardware
(SecaCryptoHW), wormholes (SecaWormhole), firewalls
(SecaFirewall) and Intrusion Detection and Preven-
tion System (IDPS) (SecaIDPS). Crypto hardware may
have a key which is used to perform cryptographic ac-
tions (SecaKey complex type in Figure 3).
A wormhole [23] enables both proactive and reactive
defense on the system and is characterized by several
parameters: the number of tolerated faulty hosts
(nFaulty tag), the number of host replicas which
can be recovered in parallel (nParallel) and timing
parameters (the recovery time, tRecovery, and the
period, tPeriod). A firewall [21], usually a network-
location device, filters packets from the network at
different layers of the OSI architecture (FilterLevel),
e.g., data-link or application-based filtering. An IDPS
monitors the network (or a single host) to discover
security breaches. Several detection methods exist
(DetectionMethod), our profile relies on the ones
described by NIST [22].
An aggregation of security hardware devices can
conform to a demilitarised zone (DMZ) [21]. There
exists many configurations for a DMZ, from a
single router to a more complex architecture. The
hosts deployed on a DMZ zone are called bastions
(SecaBastion stereotype), they offer secure services,
e.g., web, mail, FTP, DNS or honeypot. A honeypot
(SecaHoneyPot stereotype) can be a virtual machine,
a sandbox (logical) environment or a real system with
capability features. Through the operativeSystem
tagged-value we can specify the software which is
running in such confined environment knowing the
security breaches within it. Besides, the monitor
tagged-value specifies what operation and what feature
are being monitored.
A secure communication link (SecaLink stereotype)
is characterised by the number of authentication factor
(e.g., one level if only a password is needed, two levels if
a correct combination of user/password is needed, and
so on), the layer where the secure communication is
taking place and the specification of the secure protocol.
3.4. SecAM::AccessControl package
The AccessControl package supports the specification
of access control policies to the critical infrastructure.
It addresses confidentiality, integrity and authorisation
issues. Access control can be classified, depending on
the policy, in three basic groups [25]: Mandatory Access
Control (MAC)1, Discretionary Access Control (DAC)
and Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) [26].
The small set of stereotypes defined in Figure 5
include the necessary concepts to specify all the
aforementioned access control and integrity policies,
and also any other access control policies that a user
needs to devise for securing the critical infrastructure.
Control policies rely on:
1. Who is accessing to the system (SecaSubject
stereotype);
2. Which objects should be protected for un-
authorised access or modification (SecaObject
stereotype);
3. Which operations a user wants to perform on the
available objects (SecaOperation).
In SecaSubject the attributes inheritance and
exclusion allow to specify delegation of authority
and separation of duties, respectively, two major
concerns in access control policies. The other attribute,
level, allows to specify the level of security of the
subject. Such level aims to be defined by the engineer
depending on the problem context. For instance, High,
Medium, Low levels when designing a military security
policy, or Manager, Developer, Administrative when
dealing with a company’s hierarchy. Namely, Figure 5
shows the NATO clearance levels (TopSecret, Secret,
Confidential and Restricted) [27].
The type attribute (SecaOperation stereotype)
indicates the type of the operation to be performed.
1MAC is also called Lattice-Based Access Control (LBAC).
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<<Constant>> Low
<<Constant>> Medium
<<Constant>> High
<<enumerat ion>>
Degree
<<Constant>> OnDemand
<<Constant>> RealTime
<<enumerat ion>>
ScanningMode
<<Constant>> VirtualMachine
<<Constant>> Logical
<<Constant>> CapabilitySystem
<<enumerat ion>>
HPotType
<<Constant>> SignatureBased
<<Constant>> AnomalyBased
<<Constant>> StatefulBased
<<Constant>> Other
<<enumerat ion>>
DetectionMethod
<<Constant>> DataLink
<<Constant>> Packet
<<Constant>> Stateful
<<Constant>> Circuit
<<Constant>> Application
<<enumerat ion>>
FilterLevel
<<Constant>> FileSystem
<<Constant>> Registry
<<Constant>> Process
<<Constant>> Memory
<<Constant>> Services
<<Constant>> Ports
<<Constant>> All
<<enumerat ion>>
Feature
<<Constant>> Read
<<Constant>> Write
<<Constant>> Create
<<Constant>> Delete
<<Constant>> Open
<<Constant>> Kil l
<<Constant>> Close
<<Constant>> All
<<enumerat ion>>
OpMonitored
<<Constant>> Host
<<Constant>> Network
<<enumerat ion>>
Location
<<Constant>> Proactive
<<Constant>> Reactive
<<Constant>> Both
<<enumerat ion>>
DefenceType
<<Constant>> Web
<<Constant>> Mail
<<Constant>> FTP
<<Constant>> DNS
<<Constant>> Proxy
<<Constant>> VPN
<<Constant>> Honeypot
<<Constant>> Other
<<enumerat ion>>
ServiceOffered
antivirus : SecaAntivirus [0..*]
hostFirewall : SecaHostFirewall [0..*]
idpsSoftware : SecaIDPSsoftware [0..*]
webBrowser : SecaWebBrowser [0..*]
<<tupleType>>
SecaOperativeSystem
scanningMode : ScanningMode
<<tupleType>>
SecaAntivirus
filterLevel : FilterLevel
<<tupleType>>
SecaHostFirewall
detection : DetectionMethod
<<tupleType>>
SecaIDPSsoftware
<<tupleType>>
SecaWBPlugin
wbPlugins : SecaWBPlugin [0..*]
securityLevel : Degree
<<tupleType>>
SecaWebBrowser
feature : Feature
operation : OpMonitored [1..*]
<<tupleType>>
SecaMonitorFeature
name : NFP_String
version : NFP_String
vulnerabilities : SecaVulnerable [0..*]
<<tupleType>>
SecaCommonType
<<modelLibrary>>
SecAM::SecAM_Library
<<import>>
<<stereotype>>
MARTE::GRM::Resource
location : Location
defenceType : DefenceType
hitRate : NFP_Real
<<stereotype>>
SecaSecurityDevice
key : SecaKey
<<stereotype>>
SecaCryptoHW
nParallel : NFP_Integer
nFaulty : NFP_Integer
tPeriod : NFP_Duration
tRecovery : NFP_Duration
<<stereotype>>
SecaWormhole
detection : DetectionMethod[1..*]
<<stereotype>>
SecaIDPS
filterLevel : FilterLevel
<<stereotype>>
SecaFirewall
<<metaclass>>
UML::Package
service : ServiceOffered
<<stereotype>>
SecaBastion
<<stereotype>>
SecaDMZ
type : HPotType
duration : NFP_DataTime
operativeSystem : SecaOperativeSystem
cryptoHW : SecaCryptoHW [0..*]
monitor : SecaMonitorFeature [0..*]
<<stereotype>>
SecaHoneyPot
<<ex tend>>
<<profile>>
SecAM::SecureMechanisms
nFactor : NFP_Integer
layer : ProtocolLayer
protocol : NFP_String
<<stereotype>>
SecaLink
CommunicationMedia
<<stereotype>>
MARTE::GRM::
FIGURE 4. The SecAM::SecurityMechanisms package.
FIGURE 5. The SecAM::AccessControl package.
The set of operations (OperationType values) can be
redefined in order to customize them to the target
domain problem. For instance, if the engineer wants
to consider a payment as an operation, s/he can define
a permission constant such as payment which will be
valid in his/her domain.
4. TECHNICAL PROCESS
Sections 5 and 6 develop the case study of the Saudi
Arabia crude oil pipeline network. These sections
follow the main steps outlined in Figure 6 and develop
the models proposed in such figure. The model-based
process is partitioned in three sides: UML models, Petri
net models and analysis and assessment step.
UML models of the critical infrastructure are
represented by a flow model and a resource model. The
former is developed through a UML activity diagram,
while the latter using the deployment diagram. In
parallel we develop different attack models using UML
activity diagrams also. We consider paradigmatic
survivability patterns that may conform to a library of
survivability scenarios, for our case study they represent
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physical attacks and coordinated cyber-attacks. Both
models, the critical infrastructure one and those of
the attacks, are annotated using SecAM. Finally, each
SecAM variable in the attack models is parameterized for
eventually conducting sensitivity analysis. For example,
we can fix probability values for the occurrence of the
selected resistance strategies.
Petri net models, in particular Generalized stochastic
Petri nets (GSPN [6]), are obtained through UML-2-
GSPN model transformation according to the approach
in [28]. We obtain a GSPN model representing the
critical infrastructure and one GSPN model per attack
scenario.
The analysis and assessment step starts with a
qualitative analysis of the GSPN, which ensures that
the net is free of bottlenecks. Then the quantitative
assessment proceeds through sensitivity analysis.
5. SURVIVABILITY MODELLING OF A
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE
The Saudi Arabia crude-oil pipeline network is a
paradigmatic case of critical infrastructure wanted to
be attacked by terrorists, in fact it was a terrorist target
in 2006 [2]. According to [2] Saudi Arabia was the
world’s largest producer and exporter of total petroleum
liquids in 2010 and the world’s second largest crude oil
producer behind Russia. Morgan Stanley reports [29]
that a reduction in Saudi Arabia crude-oil output to 4
mmbbl/day2 (only about 5% of world demand), from
a current of 8 to 9 mmbbl/day, would cause worldwide
economic distress leading to a global recession if the
infrastructure could not be repaired in a few months.
Unless having survivability strategies leading to quickly
recover the infrastructure -in hours or few days-, the
report informs that worldwide oil prices shoot skyward.
Saudi Aramco processes the majority of crude oil
in a plant at Abqaiq and distributes it through an
extensive network of pipelines that connects the plant
to three primary oil seaports, Ras Al-Juaymath, Ras
Tanura and Yanbu, and two minor terminals, Ras Al-
Khafji and Jubail. The deployment diagram in Figure 7
depicts these facilities and the distribution network.
This distribution network operates thousands of miles
of pipelines and junctions throughout alternative
pathways, both domestic and international. Activity
diagram in Figure 8 offers an excerpt of the oil flow from
the source to the terminals with an example of the time
delays for pipes and junctions annotated using SecAM.
An enormous security force guards the distribution
network, but being more than 9000 miles long -only
the domestic pathways-, the area cannot be patrolled
completely.
Attacks to oil pipeline infrastructures may range from
physical ones (e.g., damaging seaport infrastructures,
pipeline segments or junctions) to cyber-attacks (e.g.,
compromising the network control system through a
2million barrels per day.
distributed denial of service -DDoS- or infecting it).
Survivability strategies should face the reported threats,
and may lead to recover the infrastructure -physical and
network control system- for guaranteeing oil production
timely. We present one standard survivability strategy
model for each kind of attack, using SecAM to specify
both the attacks and the survivability parameters.
The first survivability strategy, Figure 9, identifies
the three common stages: if the system does not resists
the attack then a recognition step possibly followed
by a recovery will try to maintain the infrastructure
up. The secaAttackGenerator stereotype and its tag
attack completely describe the physical attack and
the resources being attacked (pipes P1, P3 and Qadif
junction node). The secaStep stereotype is used to
model intrusions, as probabilities that will allow a
stochastic analysis of the strategy, and the demands
for recovering and repairing activities. For the latter
we used exponentially distributed random variables,
$recovery3 and $MTTR, which fit the stochastic
analysis and also allow to perform sensitivity analysis
varying the values assigned to them.
The second survivability strategy, Figure 10, de-
scribes a scenario with two coordinated attacks to differ-
ent nodes of the computing control system of the distri-
bution network. On the one hand, a DoS attack tries to
shut down the Qadif node. An IDPS (intrusion detec-
tion and prevention system) is the resistance strategy
that constantly monitorizes the network for malicious
activity. For the sake of space, we express in Figure 7
the existence of this IDPS by means of the SecaIDPS
stereotype in Qadif node (light gray annotation). If the
system does not resist recovering activities are carried
out. On the other hand, an attack to the control node
of pipe P1 tries to obtain advantage over a vulnerability
in its communication protocol for executing code arbi-
trarily (thus, gaining access to the control system). The
resistance strategy is a RSA cryptographic algorithm,
which introduces the corresponding delay ($decipher).
6. SURVIVABILITY ANALYSIS OF THE
INFRASTRUCTURE
A previous vulnerability analysis of the oil distribution
network was carried out in [2, 7]. In particular in [7], a
Time Petri Net model was used to evaluate the impact
on the network throughput of different attack plans
having as objective three network facilities (i.e., two
pipes connecting Abqaiq and Yanbu and the junction
of Qadif).
Herein, the aim of the analysis is to provide
a quantitative stochastic characterization of the
survivability requirements, devised for the two attack
scenarios specified in the previous section. For this
purpose, the survivability steps (resistance, recognition
and recovery) have been parameterized in order to
3Values preceded by $ are variables that will be parameterized
during analysis.
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FIGURE 6. Model-based process followed to develop the case study.
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FIGURE 7. An excerpt of the Saudi Arabia crude-oil pipeline distribution network.
evaluate, through sensitivity analysis, the effects of the
aforementioned attacks on the network infrastructure.
We reuse the model of the oil distribution network,
under stochastic assumptions, and the composition
approach in [7] to get the GSPN [6] models of the
network under the two types of attacks. A preliminary
qualitative analysis of the composed GSPN models has
been carry out to check whether they are well-formed
and, then suitable for evaluating survivability metrics.
In particular, we have applied linear algebra and linear
programming-based techniques to verify that:
• the network resources (i.e., pipes and junctions)
are used in conservative manner and the oil
quantity flowing through the distribution network
is preserved, and
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FIGURE 8. An excerpt of the Saudi Arabia crude-oil pipeline system flow.
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FIGURE 9. Survivability scenario of a physical attack.
• the oil flow injected in the network will reach
eventually the port terminals.
It is worth to observe that such type of analysis also
provides a feedback to the designer on the correctness
of the UML models.
In all the experiments, the GSPN models have been
solved with the GreatSPN [30] steady state simulator
(confidence level 99% and accuracy 3%).
Figure 11(A1) sketches the GSPN model used in the
analysis of the first survivability scenario, where the
clouds represent the oil distribution network subnet
and the survivability scenario under a physical attack
assumption. The latter is detailed in Figure 11(A2)
and it is obtained through UML-2-GSPN model
transformation according to the approach in [28], where
the three concurrent dotted subnets, one per each
attacked resource (i.e., the pipes P1, P3 and Qadif
junction), are obtained from the AD pattern in Figure 9.
Table 2 summarizes the parameters of the survivabil-
ity scenario of Figure 9, the (range) values assigned to
them in the sensitivity analysis and their mapping to
the transition parameters of the GSPN subnet of Fig-
ure 11(A2). In particular, in this first study, we have
assumed a perfect recognition (probability of recogni-
tion equal to one). The distribution network parame-
ters have been set to the values used in the work [7].
The GSPN model sketched in Figure 11(A1) has
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FIGURE 10. Survivability scenario of a cyber-attack.
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FIGURE 11. GSPN models of the case study.
been used to compute the network throughput (i.e., the
throughput of transition end) and the mean number of
tokens in places modelling the waiting for the resource
availability (such as wait4P1).
Figure 12(A) shows the percentage of throughput
loss due to the physical attack4 and Figure 12(B) plots
4The GSPN model of the distribution network without the
attack subnet is characterized by a throughput of Xend =
0.701146.
the number of oil barrels loss (Mbbl/day)5. For low
values of the mean time to recovery (up to 6 hours) the
throughput loss is below 20% (the number of barrels
loss is below 240Mbbl/day) and the resistance solution
does not affect sensitively the loss. As the (mean) time
to recovery increases the effectiveness of the resistance
5The number of oil barrels loss corresponds to the number
of oil barrels blocked due to the unavailability of the attacked
resources.
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Parameters Value(s) GSPN transitions
resistance [0.05-0.95] recP1OK, recP3OK, recQadifOK
recognition 1 recP1OK, recP3OK, recQadifOK
recovery [72-3] hrs recoveryP1, recoveryP3,
recoveryQadif
MTTR 6 months repairP1, repairP2 repairQadif
TABLE 2. Sensitivity analysis parameters (survivability
scenario of a physical attack).
solution becomes more important: if a low quality
resistance solution (resistance < 50%) is adopted the
throughput loss raises up to 40% for a mean time to
recovery of one day and up to 77% for a mean time
to recovery of three days. The number of barrels
loss increases to 900Mbbl/day and 1,212Mbbl/day,
respectively. In such a case, to maintain a throughput
loss below the 50% a resistance probability of at least
80% should be guaranteed. Such a requirement should
be met using hard methods, e.g., surveillance combined
with integrated perimeter security solutions (see, for
example, [31]).
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FIGURE 12. (A) Throughput loss (%) and (B) Mbbl/day
loss due to the physical attack.
The survivability scenario of a cyber-attack concerns
the oil distribution network control system and
Parameters Value(s) GSPN transitions
filterPb [0.50;..;0.95] resQadifOK
filter [1.44min;..;14.4min] filtering
decipher 2.88 min deciphering
recovery [11min-12hrs] recoveryQadif
TABLE 3. Sensitivity analysis parameters (survivability
scenario of a cyber attack).
Figure 11(B1) sketches the GSPN model used in the
analysis. In this case, the targets of the attack are
the software resources (i.e., the SCADA systems at
network nodes) that control the flow of the oil through
pipe P1 and the Qadif junction. The GSPN subnet of
the survivability scenario is detailed in Figure 11(B2):
similarly to the first study, the GSPN subnet has been
obtained by UML-2-GSPN model transformation from
the AD pattern in Figure 10 and Table 3 summarizes
the scenario parameters. In this second study, we
aim at analysing how the filtering & recovery solutions
to be developed at the Qadif node may affect the
system in terms of throughput overhead. In particular
dependent filtering parameters are assumed, i.e., the
longer the mean time required to filter the packets
(filter) the higher is the probability of filtering DoS
attacks (filterPb).
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FIGURE 13. Throughput overhead (%) in the cyber-
attack survivability scenario.
Figure 13 shows the trend of the throughput overhead
versus the filtering and recovery (mean) times. The
overhead can be maintained below 16% for recovery
solutions that require a mean time of at most 3 hours: in
such a case also filtering mechanisms with low quality
(e.g., with a filtering probability of 50% and a mean
time of about 2 minutes) can be applied. The quality of
the filtering mechanism is decisive if the time necessary
to recover the node is greater (from 6 to 12 hours).
Indeed, the overhead raises up to 61% with low quality
filters, while it can be halved by introducing filtering
mechanisms which guarantee a filtering probability of
90− 95%.
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7. RELATED WORK
We have found very few specific profiles for specification
and modelling security of critical infrastructures as
SecAM does. Marrone et al. [32] model vulnerabilities
using UML profiling and propose an analysis based on
Bayesian networks. UML-CI is proposed in [33] as a
profile for modelling critical infrastructures not focussed
on security analysis but on management.
However, the literature regarding UML profiles for
addressing security issues in general is large. In the
following we revise a few of them, but a comparison
of these approaches with SecAM is difficult since none
of them focus on critical infrastructures, survivability
analysis nor Petri nets.
Some profiles propose light-weight UML extensions
for considering security into UML designs [34–
36]. In [34] SecurityAssessmentUML profile for
general model-based security assessments is introduced.
UMLintr profile for specifying intrusions is described
in [35], it aims at specifying intrusion scenarios in
UML diagrams, however, this profile does not specify
properties of distributed attacks and it is focused only
on intrusion domain. A recent work in [36] proposes
a UML profile for specification of Role-Based Access
Control. Goudalo and Seret claim in [37] a UML
extension for security as a real solution, and propose
a set of stereotypes to deal with confidentiality into
information systems.
Other UML profiles are focused on business processes
or grid computing, such as [38–40]. In [38], Rodr´ıguez et
al. propose a UML profile that increases the expressive
ability of activity diagrams by incorporating security
requirements into the business process modelling.
In [39], a UML profile is proposed for defining
security requirements for Data Warehouses (DW) at the
business level. In the mobile Grid context, GridUCSec-
Profile is introduced in [40] and used in [41], where
a methodology is proposed to analyse, design and
construct a Secure Mobile Grid System.
SecureUML [42] allows to build secure distributed
systems. In particular, it enables the specification
of RBAC-based access control requirements together
with several authorisation constraints. Besides, it
supports code generation from the secure system
model. UMLsec [43] allows to specify security relevant
information during development of security-critical
systems. It considers RBAC as access control policy,
like SecureUML, and also provides tool-support for
formal security verification. A recent work [44]
combines UMLsec and MARTE profiles, allowing to
address both security and timing properties together
in a UML model.
Georg et al. propose in [45] an Aspect-Oriented Risk-
Driven Development where UML sequence diagrams
are transformed to Alloy language. Other works
also propose new design framework methodologies to
integrate security into the system’s design [46–48].
In the security requirements engineering domain a
recent survey can be found in [49]. It reviews and
classifies works in literature concerning security during
the development process, among them we highlight [50–
52]. In [50] UML use cases (termed as abuse cases)
are leveraged to capture security requirements and
to perform an analysis which is not based on formal
methods, unlike the analysis in our work. UMLsec
is used in [51] to express security requirements and
to analyse them through model-checking techniques.
Finally, it is worth mentioning the work in [52]
that introduces a methodology based on a goal-driven
requirements engineering process, joining the Secure
Tropos methodology and UMLsec and validating the
models also through model-checking techniques.
In the survivability analysis context, a review of
mathematical tools to achieve this purpose can be
found in [53]. These tools include Markov models,
trellis graphs and network models, among others. We
have found in [54] a work that also uses stochastic
Petri nets for survivability analysis, where a three-
step survivability framework is proposed, aiming at
survivability modelling and analysis for space systems.
8. CONCLUSIONS
The paper has demonstrated the capabilities of SecAM
in a real assessment scenario of security. SecAM has
proved proficiency to model security parameters and
requirements of a real critical infrastructure, the Saudi
Arabia oil-crude pipeline network. The attack scenarios
modeled using SecAM have led to the obtention of
a formal model, in terms of Petri nets, useful for
survivability analysis.
The results of the analysis have been highly
satisfactory. They have assessed consequences of real
threats supporting results in previous reports [2]. At
the same time, our assessment, due to the sensitivity
analysis and the powerfulness of the formal methods to
deeply characterize the infrastructure and the attacks,
has offered more insight and more detailed and accurate
results. Hence, we have been able to carefully
evaluate the survivability strategies with respect to
the throughput lost in the network, then assessing the
quality of the resistance strategies as well as the impact
of the loss.
SecAM has been built on the OMG standard
MARTE and DAM profiles, which provide support
to performance and timeliness analysis (MARTE) and
dependability analysis as well (DAM). By inheritance,
it is then possible to specify - through tagged-values -
a wide range of non-functional requirements in UML
behavioral models, then enabling trade-off analysis of
different NFPs (e.g., availability versus performance or
confidentiality versus availability). On the other hand,
the use of SecAM does not hamper the application of
other UML profiles proposed in the literature and their
related transformation approaches aimed at evaluating
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security and functional requirements, such as UMLSec.
Concerning the functional requirements analysis, the
UML-2-GSPN transformation technique applied in the
paper enables to get a Petri Net model that can be used
for checking the correctness of the UML specification,
by using either state-based techniques (e.g., model
checking) or linear algebra/linear programming-based
techniques (e.g., invariants computation, structural
bound/liveness computation). As future work, we aim
at combining SecAM with other formal methods, e.g.,
Fault Trees or Bayesian Networks as in [32], to be able
to address different kinds of analysis.
Finally, tools are a need in this context. A plug-in
for the Eclipse tool, not yet publicly released, has been
build to annotate UML models with SecAM. The tool
we have used for stochastic analysis, GreatSPN [30],
has demonstrated skills to carry out the intricacies of
the analysis.
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